Applying the Disparate Impact Rule of Law to Environmental Permitting Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by Mattheisen, Michael D.
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 2
Applying the Disparate Impact Rule of Law to
Environmental Permitting Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Michael D. Mattheisen
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Michael D. Mattheisen, Applying the Disparate Impact Rule of Law to Environmental Permitting Under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1 (2000),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol24/iss1/2
APPLYING THE DISPARATE IMPACT RULE OF LAW TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING UNDER TITLE VI OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
MICHAEL D. MATrHEISEN
In February 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898,
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations,' which applied the environmental justice
concept to federal agencies. A Presidential Memorandum issued with
E.O. 12898 specifically identified Title VI of the Civil Rights-Act of 1964
as a means of ensuring that federally assisted programs do not
discriminate against minority communities in particular by subjecting
them to "disproportionately high and adverse environmental effects.",2 In
response to the President's directive, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") issued its Interim Guidance for Investigating
Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits3 in February
Attorney, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. J.D., 1987,
George Mason University School of Law; B.A., 1978, George Washington University.
Since 1994 Mr. Mattheisen has investigated administrative complaints filed with the
Environmental Protection Agency, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its
implementing regulations, regarding alleged discrimination based on race, color, or
national origin by recipients of financial assistance from the Agency.
The views expressed herein are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Environmental Protection Agency.
' Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2 President's Memorandum for the Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 30 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 279, 280 (Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter President's Memo].
3 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/oeca/
oej/titlevi/html [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDANCE]. The Interim Guidance is based on a
legal argument presented in an amicus brief filed for EPA by the U.S. Department of
Justice ("DOJ") in August 1996 in a model environmental justice lawsuit based on Title
VI and the disparate impact rule. See generally Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Chester Residents Concerned for
Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa., May 28, 1996) (No. 96-CV-3960).
EPA's Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits was described more fully in a prior article by this author. See
generally Michael D. Mattheisen, The US. Environmental Protection Agency's New
Environmental Civil Rights Policy, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (1999).
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
1998. Based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 and the
"disparate impact rule," EPA's Interim Title VI Guidance promulgated a
new environmental civil rights policy pertaining to state environmental
permitting.
Drafted by EPA's Office of General Counsel ("OGC") and issued
by EPA's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") as an internal policy directive,
EPA's Interim Title VI Guidance was "intended to provide a framework
for the processing ... of complaints ... alleging discriminatory effects
resulting from the issuance of pollution control permits by state and local
governmental agencies that receive EPA funding."6 While internal only,
the policy acknowledged that it had broad implications for a variety of
interests, including the states, industry, and communities.
EPA's Interim Title VI Guidance is EPA's first formal attempt to
use Title VI and the disparate impact rule to apply race-based civil rights
to environmental policy and programs. This article examines the
application of the disparate impact rule to state environmental permitting
under Title VI. Part I of the article presents the environmental justice
problem and President Clinton's response, and provides a general
introduction to Title VI and the disparate impact rule. Part II of the article
examines the disparate impact rule's requirements in more detail-
especially the causation requirement. Part III discusses the analogous
causation requirement in licensing cases under the "state action rule." The
article concludes in Part IV with the proposition that neither Title VI nor
the disparate impact rule can achieve environmental justice's objectives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Environmental Justice
The EPA's new environmental civil rights policy is designed to
effectuate environmental justice, which calls for uniform environmental
and health conditions across races and income levels. 8 It relies on the
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
5 The disparate impact rule, first annunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
1971), is discussed in detail infra Part I(D).
INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 1.7 See id. at 1.
8 Environmental justice addresses the logistic distribution of benefits and
burdens in modem industrial society. Throughout the history of the
United States, there has existed an "inextricable link between
exploitation of the land and the exploitation of people." Numerous
communities scattered across the nation are suffering from the negative
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premise that minority and low-income populations or communities are
disproportionately exposed to pollution and environmental risk. The term
"environmental justice" refers to the solution; the problem is referred to as
environmental racism.9 EPA defines environmental justice as:
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people,
.regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to
the development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment
means that no group of people, including racial, ethnic, or
socioeconomic group should bear a disproportionate share of the
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial,
municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal,
state, local, and tribal programs and policies.' 0
consequences of industrial production and modem society. Indeed,
some communities are more equal than others. But where racial
discrimination exists in education, employment, housing, health care
delivery, and voting rights, it should be no surprise that it affects
environmental issues as well.
Charles Lee, Developing the Vision of Environmental Justice: A Paradigm for Achieving
Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 571, 571 (1995) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Robert D. Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental
Decisionmaking, ENVIRONMENT, May 1994, at 11). Charles Lee was Research Director
for the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, where he oversaw the
1987 Commission study Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, one of the principal
studies upon which environmental justice is founded. He was also appointed by EPA
Administrator Carol Browner to EPA's National Environmental Justice Advisory
Committee ("NEJAC"), and is currently Deputy Director of EPA's Office of
Environmental Justice ("OET').
9 See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice and the Three Great Myths of White
Americana, 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 449, 449 (1996). Luke Cole is
general counsel to the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation in San Francisco,
California, and a prominent environmental justice author, attorney, and advocate. He has
filed several Title VI environmental justice administrative complaints with EPA against
state environmental departments, and was appointed by Carol Browner to NEJAC.
10 Office of Federal Activities, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance
for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA Compliance Analyses
(visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ofa/ejepa.html>. EPA's Office of
Environmental Justice has recommended the EPA broaden its definition of environmental
justice to include fair treatment by culture and educational level as well as by race and
income. See Memorandum from Barry E. Hill, Director, U.S. EPA Office of
Environmental Justice, to Deputy Regional Administrators, Environmental Justice
Regional Coordinators, and Designated Federal Officials 1 (Dec. 16, 1998) (on file with
the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review).
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EPA's comprehensive definition encompasses two . important
environmental justice goals: an inclusive process and a proportional
environmental result or condition. It reflects the environmental justice
premise that minority and low-income populations have not been included
in environmental processes and are disproportionately subject to "negative
environmental consequences"' from private and government actions. An
inclusive process means the "meaningful involvement of all people"' in
the development and implementation of environmental law and policy.
Fair treatment does not mean the process itself, but the end result: a
condition in which no racially or economically defined group
disproportionately experiences adverse environmental impacts.
Environmental justice, however, is not as neat a concept as the EPA's
brief definition might suggest. It is, in fact, highly elastic and not
necessarily concerned with environmental issues in a conventional sense.' 3
In the words of Robert Bullard, one of environmental justice's chief
spokesmen and theorists:
The environmental justice movement has basically
redefined what environmentalism is all about. It basically
says that the environment is everything: where we live,
work, play, go to school, as well as the physical and natural
world. And so we can't separate the physical environment
from the cultural environment. We have to talk about
making sure that justice is integrated throughout all of the
stuff that we do. What the environmental justice movement
is about is trying to address all of the inequities that result
from human settlement, industrial facility siting and
industrial development. What we've tried to do over the
last twenty years is educate and assist groups in organizing
and mobilizing, empowering themselves to take charge of
their lives, their community and their surroundings. It's
more of a concept of trying to address power imbalances,
lack of political enfranchisement, and to redirect resources
T United States Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 10.
12 id.
3 For discussions of the scope and nature of the environmental justice concept, see Craig
Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation,
76 DENV. U.L. REv. 1, 10-76 (1998) and Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice. Bridging
the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U.L. REv. 221, 225-56
(1997).
[Vol. 24: 1
2000] APPLYING THE DISPARATE IMPACT RULE OF LAW 5
so that we can create some healthy, livable and sustainable
- types of models.14
Bullard defines environmental racism more simply as: "any policy,
practice or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether
intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race
or color."' 5
Environmental justice is one of six "key cross-Agency programs"
in EPA's Strategic Plan that are designed to address conditions that are
disproportionately distributed either demographically or geographically
and are not addressable through conventional regulatory approaches.' 6
Although EPA and its partners have made substantial
progress towards clean air, water, land and food, there are
many human health and environmental challenges that
14 Errol Schweizer, Interview with Robert Bullard, EARTH FIRST! J. (July 6, 1999)
<http://www.enviroweb.org/ef> (quoting Robert Bullard, Ware Professor of Sociology,
Clark Atlanta University). Professor Bullard is a major figure in environmental justice;
the author 'of many books and articles, a frequent speaker, an advocate and activist, and
occasional expert witness on a variety of subjects.
Some environmental justice constructions are less elaborate than Professor Bullard's
interpretation of the problem. See, e.g., EPA Lawyers Urged to Use Enforcement
Settlements to Spur Environmental Justice, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, May 8,
1996 ("These are not legal struggles, they're struggles over power and political
leverage."); Cole, supra note 9, at 451 ("[E]nvironmental justice struggles are not about
right and wrong. They are not struggles about what is the best thing to do in a particular
situation. They are struggles about power. They are struggles about political and
economic power, and the exercise of this power."). While the environmental justice
concept may be broad and somewhat ambiguous, environmental justice advocates' depth
of feeling cannot be gainsaid. Robert Bullard, for example, has equated it to South
African apartheid, in everything but "overt legal sanction." Robert Bullard,
Environmental Justice For All.: It's the Right Thing to Do, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281,
282 (1994). The Director of EPA's Office of Environmental Justice has equated the use
of "race-neutral criteria" by "state environmental regulatory agenc[ies]" with "'State
enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race ... under the
pretense of recognizing equality of rights."' Barry E. Hill, Chester, Pennsylvania-Was
it a Classic Example of Environmental Injustice?, 23 VT. L. REV. 479, 524-25 (1999)
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560-61 (1896).
15 Robert Bullard, Environmental Racism and Invisible Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REV.
1037, 1037 (1994).
16 See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 80 (April 3, 1995), available at
<http://www.epa. gov/docs/oejpubs/strategy/strategy.txthtml> The other "key cross-
agency programs" are: (1) Health Risks to Children, (2) the National Environmental
Performance Partnership System, (3) Community-based Environmental Protection, (4)
Indian Programs, and (5) Customer Service. See id.
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cannot be met with traditional media-specific "command
and control" approaches.... Likewise, not all areas of the
country have the same environmental problems or need the
same kind of solutions. To address these specific needs as
we move forward over the next five years, the Agency has
created a number of innovative multimedia programs that
rely on the active participation of the affected communities
to reduce specific human health and environmental risks in
the most effective manner. 17
The importance of environmental justice to EPA's programs was
recognized in EPA's 1995 Environmental Justice Strategy: "[t]he
Environmental Justice Strategy is well-integrated into the fabric of many
of the Agency's principles and initiatives which the Agency considers
fundamental to its operation and mission. In fact, environmental justice is
one of the seven guiding principles established in the Agency's strategic
plan .... 1918
B. Executive Order 12898
The environmental justice concept was adopted by, and applied to,
the federal government in February 1994 by Presidential Executive Order
No. 12898 (E.O. 12898), Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, which
directed: "[t]o the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, . . .
each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations."' 9
7Id
'8 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12898 (Feb. 11,
1994) (last modified March 1, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/docs/exeorder.txt.html>.
19 Exec. Order No.' 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). An environmental justice executive order had been
recommended by The Environmental Justice Transition Group in December 1992: "[t]o
reinforce that the principles of equal protection pertain to the entire scope [of]
environmental issues, the- President should issue an Executive Order providing for the
equitable implementation 'of environmental programs." THE ENVIRONMENTAL
TRANSITION GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION TEAM FOR
THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES 24
(1992). The Group consisted of nine environmental and civil rights associations,
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A Presidential Memorandum accompanying the executive order
directed federal agencies to use Title VI to achieve environmental justice
in minority and in low income communities.
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
each Federal agency shall ensure that all programs or
activities receiving Federal financial assistance that affect
human health or the environment do not directly, or
through contractual or other arrangements, use criteria,
methods, or practices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, or national origin.2 °
Nonetheless, neither E.O. 12898 nor the accompanying Presidential
Memorandum created any new law or changed existing law, and neither
document is enforceable at law.2 1 Which is not to say that they have no
practical effect. Each federal agency to which E.O. 12898 applies, and
some to which it does not apply, have developed environmental justice
strategic plans to implement the policy.
22
C. Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "no person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
including the United Church of Christ, which had made an earlier call for such an
executive order with its seminal environmental justice report in 1987:
1. The President of the United States is called upon to issue an
executive order mandating that all executive branch agencies with
responsibility for regulating hazardous wastes assess and consider
the impact of their current policies and regulations on racial and
ethnic communities, and take such considerations into account when
establishing new policies and promulgating new regulations.
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE & UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 24
(1987).
20 President's Memo, supra note 2, at 280.
21 See id. ("This memorandum is intended only to improve the internal management of
the Executive Branch and is not intended to, nor does it create, any right, benefit, or trust
responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against
the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.")22 See 60 Fed. Reg. 308971 (1995).
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assistance" and directs federal agencies to implement this prohibition by
regulations that do not conflict with the statute authorizing the financial
assistance.23
Title VI is a remedial civil rights statute enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Spending Clause that codifies into
statutory formula the equal protection and nondiscrimination guarantees of
the Constitution.24  The Spending Clause gives Congress the power to
attach reasonable conditions to its grants of financial assistance.25 State
environmental departments are the principal recipients of financial
assistance -from EPA, and all of their operations are covered by Title VI
when they accept federal assistance.26 Federal agencies, including EPA,
are not subject to Title VI because they do not receive "federal financial
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). The federal government
recognizes five "racial classifications": White, Black, Amerind, Asian, and Hispanic. See
40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (1999). It may not be appropriate to aggregate minority races for Title
VI purposes. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284, n. 13 (1986).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 853 (5th Cir.
1966) ("Congress therefore fashioned a new method of enforcement to be administered
not on a case by case basis as in the courts but generally, by federal agencies operating on
a national scale and having a special competence in their respective fields."); Associated
Gen. Contractors v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 968 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
(finding that Title VI was enacted to "codify into statutory formula the equal protection
and nondiscrimination guarantees of the Federal Constitution"), vac. on other grounds,
438 U.S. 909 (1977); Goodwin v. Wyman, 330 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
("Essentially, the same showing is required to establish a violation of [Title VI] as is
required to make out a racial discrimination violation under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause."), aff'd 406 U.S. 964 (1972).
25 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). This spending power is not
unlimited though. It must be used in pursuit of the general welfare, it must be related to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs, and it must be
unambiguous so the states may knowingly choose and be cognizant of the consequences
of their choice. See id. at 207.26 See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 2.
For the purposes of this subchapter, the term "program or activity" and
the term "program" mean all of the operations of-1-(1)(A) a department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of
a local government; or (B) the entity of such State or local government
that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency
(and, each other State or local governmental entity) to which the
assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local
government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1994). But see Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 198
F.3d 107 (3d Cir.. 1999) (stating that Title VI statute and regulations are "program
specific" and "[do] not preclude recipients of Federal financial assistance from
discriminating with respect to a program not receiving such assistance").
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assistance." 27 EPA's Office of Civil Rights has, on this basis,. rejected
Title VI administrative complaints because they involved EPA rather ,than
state environmental permits.
Based on OCR's review, this complaint cannot be accepted
for investigation. The two permits in question were issued
by the USEPA .... EPA's Title VI regulations define a
recipient as "any state or its political subdivision, any
instrumentality of a state or its political subdivision, any
public or private agency, institution, organization, or other
entity, or any person to which Federal financial assistance
is extended directly or through another recipient...."...
The USEPA is a Federal agency and not a recipient, as per
this definition, of Federal financial assistance. 28
The ultimate sanction for violating Title VI is the withholding of
federal financial assistance.
29
D. The Disparate Impact Rule
1. Development of the Disparate Impact Rule and EPA's Authority to
Regulate Disparate Impacts
27 See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 191 (4 th Cir.
1999); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983); Williams v. Glickman,
936 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996); Archer v. Reno, 877 F. Supp. 372, 379 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
28 Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, to Sandra K. Yerman 1 (Feb. 18, 1999) (citation
omitted) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (1996)).29 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 3.
In the event that EPA finds discrimination in a recipient's permitting
program, and the recipient is not able to come into compliance
voluntarily, EPA is required by its Title VI regulations. to initiate
procedures to deny, annul, suspend, or terminate EPA funding. EPA
also may use any other means authorized by law to attain compliance,
including referring the matter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
litigation. In appropriate cases, DOJ may file suit seeking injunctive
relief. Moreover, individuals may file'a private right of action in court
to enforce the nondiscrimination requirement in Title VI or EPA's
implementing regulations without exhausting administrative remedies.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a description of enforcement options under Title VI, see
generally Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, Title VI Manual
(visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/c-t/grantsstatutes/legalhrai. html>.
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The U.S. Supreme Court applied the disparate impact test for the
first time in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 30 under Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964.31 According to the Court in Griggs,
[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is
plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.
32
Three years later the Supreme Court applied the disparate impact
standard under Title VI for the first time in Lau v. Nichols. 33 In Lau, the
Court held that because an English language requirement for instruction
and graduation had a disparate impact on non-English-speaking Chinese
students, Title VI was violated as the school system was under affirmative
duty to compensate for language deficiencies. 34 The Court, however, did
not discuss the applicability of the disparate impact standard under Title
VI. *A divided Supreme Court did address the applicability of the
disparate impact standard to Title' VI for the first time in the plurality
decision Guardians Ass 'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York City.35
There, the Court considered a written examination used by the city to
make entry-level appointments to police department that had a disparate
impact on the pass rates of blacks and Hispanics, compared to whites, and
was not job related.36 The Court determined that even without any
discriminatory intent, proof of discriminatory effect was enough to
establish a Title VI violation.
37
'0401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.32 Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
33 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
34 See id. at 566-69.
3 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
36 See id. at 585.
37 See id. at 593.
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The Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Guardians, and
provided a clear, unanimous statement concerning the applicability of the
disparate impact rule under Title VI in Alexander v. Choate.38
As the Court in Choate explained it, Guardians offered
a two-pronged holding on the nature of the discrimination
proscribed by Title VI .... First, the Court held that Title
VI itself directly reached only instances of intentional
discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions having
an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be
redressed through agency regulations designed to
implement the purposes of Title VI. In essence, then, we
held that Title VI had delegated to the agencies in the first
instance the complex determination of what sorts of
disparate impacts upon minorities constituted sufficiently
significant social problems, and were readily remediable, to
warrant altering the practices of the federal grantees that
had produced those impacts.39
Thus, while Title VI itself prohibits only intentional
discrimination, federal agencies may, pursuant to the broad language in
Choate, prohibit unintentional discriminatory effects by adopting a
disparate impact standard in the regulations they issue to implement Title
VI. 40 EPA has inferred from this broad language correspondingly broad
3 469 U.S. 287 (1985). In Choate, the undisputed statistical evidence indicated that
27.4% of handicapped users of hospital services who received Medicaid required more
than 14 days of inpatient care, compared to only 7.8% of non-handicapped users. See id.
at 289-90. Thus, when the state Medicaid program reduced the number of days of
inpatient care it would cover, handicapped patients were disproportionately impacted.
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that since the reduction in coverage by the state
Medicaid program was made for budgetary reasons, it did not violate section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See id. at 309. The Court said that since the Medicaid
program "is neutral on its face, is not alleged to rest on a discriminatory motive," and is
based on a legitimate purpose, and because "[t]he State has made the same benefit-14
days of coverage--equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons,"
the state cannot be required under Title VI to correct an incidental inequity. Id.
39 d. at 292-94 (footnotes omitted).
40 See INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 2. Disparate impact analysis may also be
used, in combination with other factors, to prove intent in constitutional causes of action
which require a showing of intent. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious discrimination."), cited with approval in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977); Bryan v. Koch, 492 F.
Supp. 212, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[a]lthough the foreseeability of a racially adverse
2000]
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powers to regulate disparate environmental impacts through the states
under civil rights laws.
2. Elements of the Disparate Impact Rule
The disparate impact rule has been applied to a variety of state
programs under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights acts
(notably education, housing, employment and voting), 41 and the basic
elements of the disparate impact rule are now well established in case law.
They have been articulated clearly in Elston v. Talledaga County Board of
Education.
42
To establish liability under the Title VI regulations
disparate impact scheme, a plaintiff must first demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral
practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on a group
protected by Title VI. If the plaintiff makes such a prima
facie showing, the defendant then must prove that there
exists a substantial legitimate justification for the
challenged practice, in order to avoid liability. If the
defendant carries this rebuttal burden, the plaintiff will still
prevail if able to show that there exists a comparably
effective alternative practice which would result in less
disproportionality, or that the defendant's proffered
justification is a pretext for discrimination.43
In Elston, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held, first,
that a school board did not violate Title VI regulations when it failed to
make a consolidated elementary school attendance zone coextensive with
an existing black-majority high school because the plaintiff had not
demonstrated a "causal link" between the disparate impact and the school
44board's attendance zone decision. Second, assuming there was adisparate impact on black students, the school board's siting of a
impact is still a proper consideration in determining discriminatory purpose, a foreseeable
adverse impact in itself is insufficient prove discriminatory purpose." (footnote omitted)).
41 "Although the disparate impact theory was originally developed in cases involving
employment discrimination, courts have subsequently applied the theory to claims
brought pursuant to the regulations implementing Title VI." Cureton v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
42 997 F.2d 1394 (11 th Cir. 1993).
43 Id. at 1407 (citations and footnotes omitted).
44 See id.
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consolidated elementary school did not violate Title VI regulations
because the board demonstrated a "substantial legitimate justification" for
the siting decision, it was "demonstrably necessary to meeting [an]
important educational goal, 45 and the plaintiff proffered no "comparably
effective alternative" site or evidence that justification was pretextual.46
And, third, despite a disparate impact from "zone-jumping" by white
students, the school board's failure to stop zone-jumping did not violate
Title VI because the board's policy regarding zone-jumping was not
"causally linked" to the identified disparate impact of increased racial
identifiability of a training school.47
One of the few Title VI cases involving a facility (a highway) and
its effects on a minority neighborhoods to apply these disparate impact
elements was Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian,4 9
which is frequently noted and discussed in environmental justice articles.49
In Damian, the court held that construction of a new highway that had a
disparate impact on predominantly minority neighborhoods did not violate
Title VI because its location was justified, impacts were minimized, and
there were no feasible, less discriminatory alternatives. 50
Damian is inapposite to environmental permitting cases because it
involves a government facility rather than permitting or any other form of
government regulation. It was, nonetheless, relied on by thirty seven
members of Congress who wrote to EPA Administrator Carol Browner in
July 1998 urging EPA to investigate, and prevent approval of, an air
permit by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("LDEQ")
for a plastics facility proposed by Shintech, Inc., to be located in Convent,
Louisiana.51 They also asked EPA to revise its Interim Title VI Guidance
45 Id. at 1412.46 See id. at 1412-13.
41 See id. at 1415.
48 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
49 See, e.g., James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 160-65
(1994); Alan Jenkins, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination in
Federally Funded Programs, in CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL
HANDBOOK 173 (Steven Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1995); Donna Gareis-
Smith, Environmental Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection to Provide a Judicial
Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 57, 73 (1994); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 325-28 (1995).
50 See Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 127-29.
S See Letter from Thirty-seven Members of the House of Representatives, Congress of
the United States, to Carol Browner, Administrator, United States Environmental
Protection Agency 5-10 (July 16, 1998) (footnotes omitted) (on file with the William and
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to make it consistent with established Title VI law. 52 Relying on Damian,
the letter stated: "[i]n the context of environmental "protection, Title VI
prohibits discrimination that results in burdening minority populations
with disproportionate exposure to hazardous industrial operations which
are potentially inimical to their health., 53 'Applying Damian to Shintech,
the letter stated:
The LDEQ's decision to permit the Shintech facility
appears to clearly have the impermissible discriminatory
effect which is forbidden by both Title VI and the EPA's
implementing regulations in light of the grossly
disproportionate toxic exposure of African American
communities, discussed supra, which will clearly be
aggravated by location of the Shintech facility.
Indeed, there is precedent for federal agencies
implementing the strictures of Title VI when the statistical
data was even less compelling than in the Shintech case. In
the environmental discrimination case of [Damian], an
African American community group sued the Department
of Transportation under its Title VI implementing
regulations to enjoin highway construction that threatened
their neighborhood. While the district court accepted the
defendants' claim that there were no less discriminatory
alternatives, and therefore, ultimately held that there was
not a violation of Title VI, the case is instructive because
the court initially concluded that the plaintiffs had made a
prima facie showing under Title VI that the construction
and operation of a new interstate would have a disparate
effect on racial minorities. The court based its reasoning
on the evidence in the record that: (1) parts of the interstate
would travel through neighborhoods that ranged from 50%
to over 90% racial minorities; (2) 260 or nearly 75% of the
355 persons displaced by the construction of the interstate
were members of racial minorities; and (3) the disruptions
and negative impacts of highway construction and
the United States, to Carol Browner, Administrator, United States Environmental
Protection Agency 5-10 (July 16, 1998) (footnotes omitted) (on file with the William and
Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review).
52 See id. at 10-12.
5Id. at 1.
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Under the district court's reasoning in [Damian], we
believe that the EPA should find, at a minimum, that a
prima facie case exists that LDEQ's issuance of air permits
to Shintech has a disparate effect on racial minorities.
First, the Shintech facility would be located in a community
that is over 80% African American. More importantly,
95% of the residents within a one-mile radius of the
proposed Shintech complex are African American. And
the pollution burdens and threats of toxic exposure will fall
primarily on the African American community of
Convent.
54
II. DISCUSSION
A. First Requirement: Causation
As discussed above, the first step in a disparate impact case under
Title VI, is for the plaintiff to show that a particular, apparently neutral
practice or standard actually causes a disproportionate adverse effect by
race, color, or national origin. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Elston,
"[t]he plaintiff's duty to show that a practice has a disproportionate effect
by definition requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a causal link between
the defendant's challenged practice and the disparate impact identified."
55
Thus, because it prohibits causing discriminatory effects or disparate
impacts, and does not simply prohibit disparate conditions as such,
causation is a basic tenet of the disparate impact rule.
Elston cited United States v. Lowndes County Board of
Education5 6 and Freeman v. Pitts.57  In Lowndes County Board of
Education, the court held that "[riacial imbalance in the public schools
amounts to a constitutional violation only if it results from some form of
state action and not from factors, such as residential housing patterns,
which are beyond the control of state officials."
58
In Freeman v. Pitts the Supreme Court distinguished between a
statistical racial imbalance that resulted from, or was caused by, state
action and thereby gave rise to an affirmative duty to remediate, and one
4 id. at 8-9.
35 Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added).
6 878 F.2d 1301, 1305 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
" 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
38 Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., 878 F.2d at 1305.
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In Freeman v. Pitts the Supreme Court distinguished between a
statistical racial imbalance that resulted from, or was caused by, state
action and thereby gave rise to an affirmative duty to remediate, and one
that did not. There, the Court indicated that it would not require
extraordinary desegregation "measures to achieve racial balance in student
assignments in the late phases of carrying out a decree, when the
imbalance is attributable neither to the prior de jure system nor to a late
violation by the school district but rather to independent demographic
forces."59
In another Title VI case, Coates v. Illinois Board of Education,60
the court held that a complaint alleging segregation in three school
districts did not state a cause of action under Title VI because it failed to
recite how specific prior actions caused a discriminatory effect.61  The
plaintiffs asserted that they had been denied equal educational
opportunities because the defendants failed to correct school segregation. 62
The complaint asserted that the defendants were required to prevent
segregation of school facilities under state law and were affirmatively
required to change attendance units to eliminate pre-existing segregation,
and to prevent future segregation.63  For support, the plaintiff cited a
finding by the State Superintendent of Public Education that the school
districts were in violation of a state segregation and discrimination law.64
The district court disagreed with the complainants, however, and
dismissed the action because the complainants failed to link specific prior
actions to discrimination and segregation. 65  The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.66
59 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493-94. See also Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 697-98 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("The Supreme Court's 'formulations' have
only 'stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise...
an inference of causation."' (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 987 (1988))), rev'd, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
60 559 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1977).
61 See id. at 449. See also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Under a disparate impact analysis, as other circuits have
recognized, a prima facie case is established by showing that the challenged practice of
the defendant 'actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words that
it has a discriminatory effect."' (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, Missouri,
508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)).
62 See Coates, 559 F.2d at 446-48.
63 See id. at 447-48.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 447.
66 See Coates v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Under the disparate impact rule, causation must be identified with
some particularity; generalized allegations of causation will not support a
disparate impact claim. In Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion
67(LUCHA) v. HUD, for example, the First Circuit found "the disparate
impact model . . . inappropriate because plaintiffs point[ed] to no specific
practice--objective or subjective-that allegedly caused a discriminatory
impact on minorities." 68 Plaintiffs had only claimed that the defendant,
the City of Chelsea, employed a "disproportionately low number of
minorities." 69 But the court found this claim insufficient to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. The court said that the disparate
impact rule required "the threshold of a specific, facially-neutral procedure
(or possibly, a combination of procedures) .... It also indicated that
"the disparate impact model was created 'to challenge those specific,
facially-neutral practices that result in a discriminatory impact and that by
their nature make intentional discrimination difficult to prove."' 7' The
court concluded: "[i]f plaintiffs' claims do not focus on a specific practice,
it is impossible to apply the Griggs analysis, which envisions the employer
rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the practice
leading to a disparate impact was justified as necessary to the employer's
,,72business.
2. The Causation Requirement Was Codified in Title VII
The causation requirement of the disparate impact model was
explicitly codified in Title VII when that title was amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.7' The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "to
codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., . . .and in the other
Supreme Court disparate impact decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,' '74 and "to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory
67 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986).
61 Id. at 786.
69/d.
7 0 Id. (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 787 (citation omitted) (quoting Atonio v. Wade Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d
1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985)).72 Id. (citations omitted).
3 Pub L. No. 102-166 § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (1994). See James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 163-
64 (1994).
74 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3. In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court required that
complainants show that a particular practice caused a statistical racial imbalance in the
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guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.",75 Consistent with the disparate impact rule,
the amended Title VII requires causation proceeding from a particular
practice:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on
disparate impact is established under this title only if-(i) a
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity;
Title VII has been, and remains, a basic reference for Title VI
law.
77
3. EPA Title VI Regulations Regarding Causation
EPA's Title VI regulations, also expressly incorporate the
disparate impact rule's causation requirement and specifically prohibits
"criteria or methods" (standards or practices) that cause discriminatory
effects "with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, [or] national
origin. ' 78 Likewise, these regulations prohibit facility sitings that cause
discriminatory effects. 79
The relationship between the causation (with particularity)
requirement under the disparate impact rule and the "criteria and methods"
requirement under Title VI implementing regulations was described in
Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA):
workforce, but did not require the employer prove that the challenged practice wasjustified by "business necessity," only a "business justification." See Wards Cove
Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-61 (1989).
75 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3.
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
77 See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417(11th Cir. 1985);'Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.14(11 th Cir. 1993); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984); Powell v. Ridge,
189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999).
7840 C.F.R. § 7.35(b).9See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c).
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Our analysis [concerning particularity in the disparate
impact rule] is also consistent with the language of 24
C.F.R. § 1.4 [HUD Title VI regulations], which
contemplates a challenge to particular "criteria or methods
of administration" that result in a discriminatory impact.
As noted above, plaintiffs have not pointed to any such
specific criterion or method. Moreover, following
plaintiffs' argument to its logical conclusion leads to an
untenable result. If [the City of] Chelsea is guilty of
discriminating simply because it has few minority
employees, a city with no minority residents in 1970 and 22
percent minority residents in 1980, and no city hiring
during that decade, would be in violation of the law. In
effect, discrimination law would embody a mandatory
affirmative action component, including a requirement that
white employees be fired to enable the hiring of minorities.
We are certain that Griggs does not countenance such a
scenario.
80
This case is useful because it involved Title VI regulations issued
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") that
were virtually identical to EPA's in their operative language..
4. Summary of the Causation Requirement
In disparate impact cases, the causation requirement itself is
usually not an issue. The causation question is usually not a legal one-
whether causation is required, but a factual one-whether a particular
"o Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA) v. HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 787 (lst Cir.
1986). Courts may not create substantive constitutional rights to guarantee equal
protection of the laws, such as to housing, education, or employment. See San Antonio
Independent Sch. Dist. V. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 216 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 n.14 (1977). The Court has thus
far declined to recognize a constitutional right to a clean environment. See Stop H-3
Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1430 n.21 (9th Cir. 1989).
81 Compare 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i) (2000) ("A recipient [of federal funds], in
determining the types of housing accommodations, facilities, services, financial aid, or
other benefits which will be provided ... may not .. utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting persons to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin .... .") with 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1999) ("A recipient
shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or
sex .... ).
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whether causation is required, but a factual one-whether a particular
standard or practice actually caused a particular disparate impact.82 In
every case where a violation is found, the standard or practice in question,
despite being "facially neutral," ig found to be not "neutral in fact, 83
meaning that despite being neutral on its face, or in its terms, the standard
or practice actually causes a disparate impact or disproportionate effect.
It is important to note, however, that just because a particular
standard or practice has an adverse disparate impact, that standard or
practice does not necessarily violate Title VI or the disparate impact rule.
Despite the adverse disparate impact, the particular standard or practice
may be programmatically justified.
5. First Corollary to the Causation Requirement: Statistical Racial
Balance Not Required
A corollary of the causation requirement is that a statistical racial
demographic imbalance in and of itself does not violate the disparate
impact rule, or mean that a Title VI violation has necessarily occurred.84
As the disparate impact rule only prohibits causing disparate impacts, not
the mere existence of disparate impacts or conditions, neither Title VI nor
the disparate impact rule necessarily requires a racially balanced result or
condition. 85 This corollary was addressed in Freeman:
That there was racial imbalance in student attendance zones
was. not tantamount to a showing that the school district
was in noncompliance with the decree or with its duties
under the law. Racial balance is not to be achieved for its
own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has
been caused by a constitutional violation. Once the racial
imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied,
the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance
that is caused by demographic factors. If the unlawful de
jure policy of a school system has been the cause of the
racial imbalance in student attendance, that condition must
82 See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1993).
83 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
84 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 424 (1986); Pasadana City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424, 433 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
24 (1971); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 465, 472 (1972).
85 See United States v. Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., 878 F.2d 1301, 1305
(llth Cir. 1989).
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showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a
proximate way, to the prior violation.
8 6
This corollary was also addressed in Lowndes County Board of
Education, where the Eleventh Circuit held that it was "inappropriate" to
require that the enrollment ratios in each of a school district's schools
mirror the racial composition of the community as a whole.8 7 The court
cited demographic factors as the reason for the imbalance, and said
"[r]acial imbalance in the public schools amounts to a constitutional
violation only if it results from some form of state action and not from
factors, such as residential housing patterns,. which are beyond the control
of state officials."
88
In Coates, the Seventh Circuit squarely addressed the question of
whether a plaintiff can hold a state liable for the mere existence of
segregation (and rejected it): "Plaintiffs seek to have the defendant held
liable for a state-found condition of segregation by reason of the existence
of the condition itself and not because of any responsibility for its
creation. Such a finding without more is not a talisman which can invoke
Title VI affirmative remedial action."
8 9
This corollary was also applied in Edwards v. Johnson County
Health Dept,90 the only court decision involving the disparate impact rule
and permitting. The question in Edwards was whether granting permits for
substandard housing for (mostly) non-white migrant farmworkers violated
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII)91 and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee.92 The court pointed out that, "any
policy or action taken with respect to these workers will necessarily affect
86 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1992). As the Supreme Court said in Swann,
"[n]either school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-
by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty
to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is
eliminated from the system." Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32. See also Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Schools, 197 F.3d 123, 131-33 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding nonremedial
racial balancing unconstitutional).87 See Lowndes County Bd. of Educ., 878 F.2d at 1305.
88 Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to expressly forbid annual
readjustments in racial balances, reasoning that once the segregation due to state action
has been eliminated, tinkering with racial ratios would exceed the scope of Title VI. See
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 427 U.S. at 434-35.
89 Coates v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 449 n.9 (7th Cir. 1979).
90 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1989).
9' 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
9' See Edwards, 885 F.2d at 1217.
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more non-white than white migrant farmworkers," 93 but found that no
violations of either Title VIII or the Due Process Clause were present
because "appellants have failed to allege more than statistical disparity.
94
6. Second Corollary to the Causation Requirement: No Affirmative
Duty to Prevent Discrimination
Another corollary of the causation requirement, closely related to
the first, is that Title VI does not impose an affirmative duty to prevent or
counteract discrimination generally, or discrimination caused by others.95
Under Title VI, a recipient must refrain from causing disparate impacts,
but is not required or authorized to prevent or counteract disparate impacts
it did not cause.96
In MC. West, Inc. v. Lewis,97 a federal district court explained,
"[t]he language of Title VI does not specifically call for affirmative action.
... The tendency to turn the language of laws that require racial neutrality
thou-shalt-not-discriminate laws into authority for granting racial
preference is twisting the plain meaning of statutes too far.",98 In Latinos
Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA) the First Circuit discussed Title
VI implementing regulations, and rejected a reading of the statute that
would include an affirmative action requirement.99 Although the court
found that there was a disproportionately low number of minorities
employed by the City of Chelsea, which may have been the result of "an
inhospitable working environment for them,"' 00 the court nonetheless
9 Id. at 1223.
94 Id. at 1224. Cf Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) ("In a
Title VII case, racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's Work force, does not,
without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to the
selection of workers for the employer's other positions .... "). See also Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 n.19 (1972) ("Since the Texas procedure challenged here
[providing lower benefits recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children] is
related to the purposes of the welfare programs, it is not proscribed by Title VI simply
because of variances in the racial composition of the different categorical programs.");
United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525, 530 (E.D. La. 1989) ("The Court has not
attempted to require that the schools have a particular racial balance; such would ignore
the wealth of non-race related factors that may legitimately affect racial make-up at
different schools and organizations.").
9' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
96 See Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA) v. HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 784 (1st
Cir. 1986).
97 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
9' Id. at 345.
99 See LUCHA, 799 F.2d at 784.
10 Id.
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held, "Chelsea is not required to adopt an affirmative action policy in
order to avoid a finding of intentional discrimination under Title VI. In
fact, it may be prohibited from employing affirmative action practices in
the absence of a prior finding of discrimination."''0
EPA's Title VI regulations, however, do incorporate a remedial
affirmative duty in cases where a recipient of federal funding has
discriminated on the basis of race, color, or national origin.0 2
B. Second Requirement: Justification
The second step in a disparate impact case is for the defendant to
justify (i.e., excuse) the particular standard or practice that causes the
adverse disparate impact.' °3 As the court said in Damian, "[d]efendants
are not per se prohibited from . . . [taking actions that] will have
differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits taking
actions with differential impacts without adequate justification."',0 4
To justify a practice or standard, one must show that there is a
programmatic reason for the practice or standard05Os  While this
requirement is known as the "business necessity" test, 10 6 it has also been
applied in education and employment.'0 7  "Necessity" in any of these
cases, however, does not mean the practice or standard is required to be
essential, but only "related to" the defendant's program.' 08
Consistent with the causation requirement, it is the practice or
standard causing the disparate impact that must be justified, not the
disparate impact itself.10 9 In Connecticut v. Teal, the Supreme Court
explained that Title VII ''speaks, not in terms of jobs and promotions, but
in terms of limitations and classifications that would deprive any
individual of employment opportunities."110
101 Id.
102 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(a)(7) (1999).
103 See Elston v. Talledaga County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1993).
'04 Coalition of Concerned Citizens v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (D. Ohio 1984).
15 Title VI regulations must not be inconsistent with the achievement of the objectives of
the programmatic statute pursuant to which the financial assistance is provided. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
'o6 See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334 (3d Cir. 1981).
107 See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing "educational
necessity").
log See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); NAACP v. Medical Ctr.,
657 F. Supp. at 127.
109 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1982).
110 Id. at 448 (emphasis in original). It is axiomatic that civil rights attach to individuals,
not groups or races. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289
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Inasmuch as it is the standard or practice that causes the
disproportionality that must be justified, the appropriate or relevant
facilities to be looked at in any disparate impact case involving the
permitting of facilities consists of those facilities to which the standard or
practice applies, and the relevant population is the population that is
affected by those facilities."1  Using this standard, the Fourth Circuit
explained why the plaintiffs in Edwards, non-white migrant farmworkers,
were deficient in their lawsuit:
Appellants allege only ...that appellees' actions have a
greater adverse impact on non-white migrant farmworkers
than on their white colleagues. The standard by which this
greater adverse impact allegation must be tested is
"whether the policy in question had a disproportionate
impact on minorities in the total group to which the policy
was applied.". . . In the case at bar, the state permit
requirement applied only to migrant housing facilities in
North Carolina, and the sharp focus of appellants' claims is
the migrant housing facilities in Johnston County. To
allege a valid disparate impact claim, appellants must
therefore contend that appellees' actions had a greater
adverse impact on- minority migrant farmworkers in
Johnston County than on that county's white migrant
farmworkers. Yet, nowhere in the Complaint do appellants
contend that the appellees' actions affected non-white
(1978) ("It is settled beyond question that the 'rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights."' (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
Civil rights acts, for example, prohibit discrimination against "persons" or "individuals."
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally-assisted education
programs); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting discrimination against the disabled in federally-
assisted programs); 76 U.S.C. § 6102 (prohibiting age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally-assisted
programs); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in employment); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in public
accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in housing). EPA's
nondiscrimination regulations also prohibit discrimination against a "person." 40 C.F.R.
§§ 7.30, 7.35, 7.45, 7.50. -E.O. 12898, and EPA's environmental justice definition and
Interim Title VI guidance, however, address discrimination against "populations,"
"communities," or "groups of people."
'1 See Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dept., 885 F.2d 1215, 1223-24 (4th Cir.
1989).
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migrant farmworkers to a greater degree than white
farmworkers. Nor could such a contention reasonablybe
made; manifestly, white and nonwhite migrant workers
suffered the same degree of harm because they shared the
same substandard housing." 12
C. Third Requirement: Alternatives and Pretext
The third, and final, step in a disparate impact case comes about
only if theplaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate results
from the defendant's standards or practices, and the defendant has
responded by demonstrating that they were programmatically justified.
Here, the plaintiff still has an opportunity to win his case if he shows that
there exists a feasible, comparably effective alternative standard or
practice that would result in less disproportionality, or that the defendant's
proffered justification is a pretext for discrimination." 13
In Damian for example, even after finding that the plaintiffs had
made "a prima facie showing of disparate impact upon racial
minorities" 1 from the chosen location of a new highway,"15 the court
found that there was no Title VI violation under a disparate impact theory
because the defendants had justified the highway's location "by
articulating legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the location" and
minimizing its impacts," 6 and because the-plaintiffs had failed to show
that there were "any appropriate alternatives to be considered."11 7
112 Id. at 1223 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Ass'n, 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984)).
1"3 See Elston v. Talledaga County Bd. of Educ, 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1993).
14 Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (D.
Ohio 1984).
115 The court recognized that the proposed highway "would travel through neighborhoods
that range from 50% to over 90% racial minorities," that "of the 355 persons displaced by
the construction of 1-670, 260 or nearly 75% are members of racial minorities," and that
"the disruptions and negative impacts of highway construction and after the highway is
operating will fall primarily upon neighborhoods that are mostly comprised of
minorities." Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 127.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 128 (emphasis in original). At trial the plaintiffs argued that the proposed
highway was a "very indirect route." This argument was rejected by the district court as
speculative. See id. The plaintiffs further -argued that the Environmental Impact
Statement undertaken by the defendant was inadequate. The court rejected this argument
as well, indicating that plaintiffs need to do more than point out deficiencies-they need
to offer reasonable, feasible alternatives. See id. at 127. Finally,
plaintiffs put forth an alternative solution [to the proposed freeway]. ..
This alternative involved a combination of light rail transport and
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Similarly, in Elston the court found the plaintiffs' case lacking
because they failed to show pretext or to present any viable, alternate site:
"Since plaintiffs have proffered no other alternative sites, they have not
met their ultimate burden of proof; thus, the district court properly decided
in defendant's favor on the Title VI regulation challenge to the siting of
the new school."' "
18
III. STATE ACTION AND LICENSING
While there are virtually no reported court decisions under the
disparate impact rule involving permitting programs, there are. instructive
court decisions involving licensing under the state action rule. These
cases can provide an analog for the causation requirement under the
disparate impact rule." 9
A. State Action Requirement Generally
The state action rule is used in civil rights cases, brought under
either the Constitution or civil rights statutes, to bring private
discrimination within the ambit of federal protection. Most federal
Constitutional protections only apply to the government, not to private
parties. 12 The problem in state action cases is, therefore, to tie private
improvements to streets in the area. . . . [T]his alternative was
considered and found wanting. Although that restudy did conclude that
the construction of a freeway was not the only feasible solution to the
transportation problems of the area, it appears clearly in the record that
plaintiffs' alternative was considered to be inadequate.
Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 127-28.
18 Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413. Although one alternative site was discussed by the court, it
was found to be an inadequate site since the land was not available to the school board.
See id.
"19 For example, in United States v. City of Black Jack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974), the Eighth Circuit said,
[in a Title VIII suit, t]o establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct
of the defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination;
in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect .... The plaintiff
need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial
discrimination in housing was racially motivated.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85 (citations and footnote omitted). It also indicated
that its "holding is consistent with cases involving racial discrimination in other areas."
Id. at 1185 n.2.
120 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or protecting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
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discriminatory action and the state together in order to bring about greater
Constitutional or federal statutory protections. 12 1  Distinguishing state
action from private action, however, is not always easy to do. 122 Under
the state action rule, a state must have so involved itself with the private
discriminatory action that the latter may fairly be attributed to the state. 12 3
In answering the question whether an alleged infringement of
federal rights was fairly attributable to the state, the Supreme Court stated,
"a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when
it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State.' ' 124  The fair attribution test has two
requirements. "First, the deprivation [of civil rights] must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is
of speech...." (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphasis added)).
The courts have examined and reaffirmed, time and time again, this state action
requirement. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) ("In
1883, this Court in The Civil Rights Cases set forth the essential dichotomy between
discriminatory action by the State, which is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause,
and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which that clause
'erects no shield,' (citation omitted) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948));
Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Miss. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283
(5th Cir. 1985) ("Most constitutional rights are secured from infringement by
governments, not private parties."); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d
959, 966 (4th Cir. 1963) ("[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence
to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its
manifestations has been found to have become involved in it."); Knubbe v. State Mutual
Assurance Co. of Am., 808 F. Supp. 1295, 1304 (D. Mich. 1992) ("The rights secured by
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are rights to
protection against unequal or unfair treatment by the state, not by private parties.").
I See Frazier, 765 F.2d at 1285 n.12.
122 While the principle is easily stated, the question of whether particular
discriminatory conduct is private, on the one had, or amounts to "state
action," on the other hand, frequently admits of no easy answer. "Only
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."
Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 637 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
123 See Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 637.
124 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982), quoted in Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 427
U.S. 830, 839 (1982) and Frazier, 765 F.2d at 1284.
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responsible."' 125 "Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."'
' 26
. There are three possible scenarios where one can qualify as a state
actor. First, he can be a state actor if"he is a state official."' 127 Second, he
can be a state actor if "he acted together with, or obtained significant aid
from, state officials."' 28 Finally, he can be a state actor if "his conduct.is
chargeable to the state."'
' 29
In Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc.,130 the Fifth Circuit stated
that "a general state involvement with the corporation or industry is not
sufficient to support a claim."' 3' There must be more: .'[t]he inquiry must
be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the later may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."",132 Moreover, "[t]he
involvement must be directly related to the action that gives rise to the §
1983 claim. State action can be found 'only when it can be said that the
State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains.' . . . The state's role must be active; approval or acquiescence
in a private party's actions is not enough."' 13
3
123 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1981).
126 id.
127 Knubbe v. State Mutual Assurance Co. of Am., 808 F. Supp. 1295, 1301 (D. Mich.
1992).
128Id.
129 id.
130 774 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1985).
'3 Id. at 1348.
132 Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
133 Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a civil remedy
for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment but does not create any substantive rights or
law. Like Title VI, this very powerful section is extremely brief:
Every person who, under of color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Remedial laws do not create substantive constitutional rights.
See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 749 (1999); Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979).
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B. Licensing
-As noted above, Title VI was enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause so that the nondiscrimination prohibitions of the Constitution
would apply to all recipients of federal financial assistance, not just to the
states.
In a state action case involving licensing, the Supreme Court held
that licensing (and regulation) in and of itself does not implicate the state
in discrimination by the licensee.' 34 To implicate the state, licensing must
directly cause the discrimination complained of. Thus, whether an action
is brought for unintentional discriminatory effects under the disparate
impact rule or for intentional discrimination under the state action rule,
causation is required and is the sine qua non of state liability. 35
134 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). See also Miner v.
Commerce Oil Refining Corp., 198 F. Supp. 887, 891 (D.R.I. 1961) ("It is obvious that
the defendant is not an agent or instrumentality of the State of Rhode Island. The fact
that it held a license to construct and operate an oil refinery, issued by said Town of
Jamestown pursuant to State law, did not make it an agency of the State and does not
render its action, purportedly taken to protect its rights under said license, State action
within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.A 1983."); Montanez
v. Colegio De Tecnicos De Refrigeracion Y Aire Acondicionado De Puerto Rico, 343 F.
Supp. 890, 896 (D.P.R 1972) ("[M]erely acting under state license or charter is not a state
action within the context of the civil rights laws.").
135 The purpose of the causation requirement under the disparate impact rule and under
the state action rule is the same.
If a thread of commonality is to be drawn from the various
forms in which state action can manifest itself through the conduct of
private parties, it is that attribution is not fair when bottomed solely on
a generalized relation with the state. Rather, private conduct is fairly
attributable only when the state has had some affirmative role, albeit
one of encouragement short of compulsion, in the particular conduct
underlying a claimant's civil rights grievance. "The purpose of this
[close nexus] requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are
invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains."
Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Miss. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1286
(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). See also Bennett
v. Dyer's Chop House, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 153, 154 (N.D. Ohio 1972) ("If state action is
to be proven in this case [involving a bar policy to exclude all women customers during
certain hours] it must be on the basis of the control exerted by the State of Ohio through
its Department of Liquor Control and the relationship between the defendant and this
Department.") Indeed, causation is a basic requirement of the constitutional doctrine of
standing.
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"--an invasion of a
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State environmental programs or departments, however, typically
do not compel or even influence the existence, location, or distribution of
private facilities through environmental permits, 136 and permits issued by
the states are not financial assistance that further extends coverage and
liability to permittees.1
37
The seminal state action licensing cases are Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis and Player v. Alabama Department of Pensions and Security.138
The causation principles enunciated in these cases, and followed in
subsequent state action cases, apply equally well to environmental
permitting under Title VI and the disparate impact rule.
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural or hypothetical."' Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102 (1983)) and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S.
26, 41-42 (1976)).
136 This is unlike the situation in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963), for example, where government regulation did influence private
facilities. In Simkins, state action was found where "the defendant hospitals operate as
integral parts of comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or programs
designed to effect a proper allocation of available medical and hospital resources for the
best possible promotion and maintenance of public health" pursuant to the Hill-Burton
Act. Id. at 967. The "Act itself and its legislative history reveal[ed] emphasis on the
creation of a State-wide system of hospitals for the provision of hospital service to all the
people of the State (which) indicates that the Hill-Burton program was not limited to the
granting of financial aid to individual hospitals. It shows, rather, a congressional design
to induce the States, upon joining the program, to undertake the supervision of the
construction and maintenance of adequate hospital facilities throughout their territory.
Upon joining the program a participating State in effect assumes, as a State function, the
obligation of planning for adequate hospital care." Id. at 968 (emphasis in original). See
also Smith v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 336 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding state
action where a motel was "part and parcel of a large, significant, and continuing public
enterprise-the Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project").
137 See Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605-06
(1986); Herman v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 60 F.3d
1375, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1995); New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection and Energy v. Long
Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 417 (3d Cir. 1994); Gottfried v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 655 F.2d 297, 312-13 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Montanez v. Colegio
De Tecnicos De Refrigeracion Y Aire Acondicionado De Puerto Rico, 343 F. Supp. 890,
896 (D.P.R. 1972).
13' 400 F. Supp. 249 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
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1. Moose Lodge
In Moose Lodge, the African American plaintiff who was refused
service at the local lodge of a national fraternal organization claimed that
the refusal of service was state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment (requiring intent) because the Pennsylvania Liquor Board had
issued the Lodge a private club license that authorized the sale of alcoholic
beverages on its premises.' 39 The plaintiff did not argue that the Board
had any discriminatory intent, but nonetheless "named both the Lodge and
the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority as defendants, seeking injunctive relief
[under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] that would have required the defendant liquor
board to revoke Moose Lodges' license .... The Supreme Court
found that merely issuing a license to the discriminating business did not
make the state responsible for the business' discriminatory actions; the
state was only responsible for its own discriminatory actions. 141
The Court has never held, of course, that
discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be
violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity
receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State,
or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.
..;Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the
discrimination is private, the State must have "significantly
involved itself with invidious discriminations" in order for
the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition. 42
While Pennsylvania had licensed the discriminating business, licensing
alone did not significantly involve the state with the private discrimination
because licensing as such did not cause the private discrimination. 143 Nor
did the state's comprehensive regulation of the business make the
business' discrimination state action; again, because the state regulation
did not cause the discrimination. 1
44
139 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).
140 Id.
141 See id. at 172.
142 Id. at 173 (citation omitted) (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
143 See id. at 176-77.
'See id.
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Nonetheless, the state was responsible for its own requirements
that did cause discrimination, even if those requirements were facially
neutral. 145 Because state regulations required Moose Lodge to adhere to
that facility's own constitution and bylaws, both of which called for racial
discrimination, the state essentially turned discriminatory private rules into• 46
state law by making them subject to government sanction.
2. Player
Principles, similar to those found in Moose Lodge, can also be
found in Player, a class action suit against the Alabama Department of
Pensions and Security ("DPS") and six childcare institutions by "black
children who have been, and who will be, in need of the services provided
by DPS and the defendant homes.' 47
Plaintiffs claimed that DPS discriminated against them and
their class by a practice of segregated referrals to the child-
care institutions in the state, provision of foster care in
segregated settings, failure to ensure that the child-care
institutions it licenses operate on a nondiscriminatory basis
and failure to provide adequate foster care facilities for
blacks. Plaintiffs further assert that DPS had discriminated
against them and their class in its assistance to county
courts and other agencies in placing children in child-care
facilities and in its failure in general to discharge its duties
toward black children on a level commensurate with the
discharge of those duties toward white children. 148
These practices were alleged to violate rights guaranteed by "the
Constitution and certain laws of the United States," including the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI.149
As in Moose Lodge, the state licensed and comprehensively
regulated the businesses that were engaging in the discriminatory
activities. And, just as in Moose Lodge, licensing and regulation alone did
not make the private discrimination state action. As the court stated,
145 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972).
146 See id. at 177-79.
147 Player v. Alabama Dept. of Pensions and Security, 252-53 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
148 Id. at 253.
'" Id. at 253, 257.
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[n]one of the regulations or licensing requirements relate to
the admissions practices of the homes. None define the
-types of children which can or cannot be accepted. The
granting of the license, or the enforcement of the
regulations, cannot be said to encourage or foster the
discriminatory admissions policies. Under the principles of'
[Moose Lodge], the issuance of the license and the
enforcement of the licensing regulations do not, taken
alone, make the actions of the homes state action. 
150
Again, however, the state was responsible for its own
discriminatory practices, particularly where the state directed the outcome.
In this case, the state's discriminatory practices took the form of
"[r]eferrals of children to homes by the DPS and the associated casework
services and summaries [which] are valuable benefits that the state confers
on needy children."15' Thus, "[i]n failing to provide institutional care for
black children, either through its own facilities or through contract, to the
same extent that it does for white, the DPS has denied the plaintiff class
the equal protection of the laws.' 15 2  In addition, DPS did provide
financial assistance to the homes, which also constituted a Title VI
violation. 1
53
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The question for environmental justice is, of course: how do these
disparate impact requirements, and the causation requirement in particular,
apply to environmental permitting under Title VI?
While the disparate impact rule has been applied to a variety of
state programs under the civil rights acts, these programs have typically
involved the state's own facilities and operations. Permitting, however,
generally involves private facilities that usually are not subject to Title VI,
because they typically do not receive federal financial assistance
themselves and they are not owned and operated by the state recipient that
is subject to Title VI. Accordingly, the application of the disparate impact
50 Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
151 Id. at 257. DPS was the source of most referrals to virtually all child-care institutions
in the state, and the only source for some. See id. at 256 & n.13. "[T]he provision of
DPS case summaries and other background material, ... in connection with a referral
[was] a substantial direct benefit to the home as well as to the child." Id. at 257 n. 16.
" Id. at 257.
153 See Player v. Alabama Dept. of Pensions and Security, 400 F. Supp 249, 257-58.
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rule under Title VI to permitting and to private facilities receiving permits
is virtually unprecedented and even novel.
Environmental permitting does not cause pollution or polluting
facilities. Rather, its purpose and effect is to reduce or limit the amount of
pollution that would otherwise be emitted. Nor does environmental
permitting in and of itself influence or determine the distribution of
facilities, or cause an uneven or inequitable distribution of pollution or of
facilities with environmental permits, independently of the particular
standards or practices used to issue the permits. Siting has the effect of
locating facilities in proximity to particular populations, whether minority
or not, but state environmental departments typically do not site facilities.
The simple fact that states issue permits that limit or reduce pollution and
without which the facilities could not operate does not necessarily mean
state permitting caused a particular distribution. It does, however, suggest
a means by which the states might influence or control the distribution of
facilities, even if it does not authorize or require the states to do so.
Although environmental permitting per se has no effect on the
distribution of facilities, particular standards and practices used to issue
permits may. Title VI and the disparate impact rule may be violated
where a particular standard or practice used in issuing environmental
permits causes facilities to be located in proximity to particular
populations, or permit limits to be more lenient proximate to particular
populations-if the standard or practice is not programmatically justified
and there is no feasible, comparably effective alternative that has a less
disproportionate effect.
The environmental justice issue isn't that the states or
environmental programs actually cause an uneven or inequitable
distribution of facilities or pollution, but rather that they don't prevent it-
not just for minorities, but for everyone. Title VI and the disparate impact
rule, however, do not require or authorize the states to prevent or
counteract discrimination that they do not cause, and do not prohibit
disparate environmental or other social conditions as such. Despite their
presumed potential as environmental justice legal tools, given their
requirements and the realities of environmental permitting, Title VI and
the disparate impact rule actually appear to have limited utility as
remedies for addressing environmental justice concerns or for achieving
environmental justice objectives.
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